This paper argues (against Fred Feldman) that happiness and pleasure are distinct states of mind because they stand in a distinct logical relation to belief. Roughly, being happy about a state of affairs s implies that one believes that s satisfies the description 's' and that it is in some way good whereas taking pleasure in s does not. Feldman's analysis of happiness in terms of attitudinal pleasure overlooks this distinction.
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happiness, like pleasure, to be a state of mind -something that cannot by definition be affected by events taking place after one's death or without one's knowledge. Feldman also understands himself to be concerned with the ordinary modern meaning of 'happiness', and I assume with the ordinary modern meaning of 'pleasure' too, though he is less explicit on this latter point.
Secondly, I treat both pleasure and happiness as primarily attitudinal states, that is, as states directed towards an object, whether a thing, event or state of affairs. This is controversial, in both cases, and requires some words of justification.
Philosophers debate whether what makes an experience pleasant is the presence of a distinct sensation of pleasure or simply the fact that we take pleasure in it. The first is the sensational, the second the attitudinal view of pleasure. (A parallel debate takes place about pain.)
Attitudinal theories of pleasure vary according to their characterisation of the attitude in question. Candidates include enjoying, apprehending as desirable, desiring to continue, and being pleased about.
2 Among these, the most plausible is enjoying, since it implies least in the way of judgements and motives. If you take pleasure in a melody, you must at least be enjoying it, though you needn't apprehend it as desirable, desire it to continue, or be pleased about it. I return to the issue in due course.
Both sensational and attitudinal views of pleasure face problems. The sensational view confronts the objection that pleasures form an open-ended and heterogeneous set, with no obvious common quality. What could unite the experiences of eating pickled walnuts, listening to Peking opera and perusing economic statistics other than the fact that some 2 'Apprehending as desirable' comes from Sidgwick [1874: 127] . 'Desiring to continue' comes from Brandt [1979: 38] . 'Being pleased about comes from Feldman [2010: 109] .
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human beings take pleasure in them? On the other side, the attitudinal view faces the problem that some sensations seem to be simply pleasant, whether or not we take pleasure in them. A dedicated monk might find the touch of a woman's hand pleasant though he does not take any pleasure in it. Similarly, pains can be enjoyed without thereby ceasing to be pains.
L. W. Sumner [1996: 81-112] has suggested a sensible compromise. Pleasure, he argues, can refer either to a specific bodily sensation, typically associated with sex, warm baths and the like, or to a general attitude of taking pleasure in or enjoying. (Likewise, pain can refer either to a specific bodily sensation or to a general attitude of finding disagreeable or 'disenjoying'.)
There is no necessary connection between these two types of pleasure: sensory pleasures are typically and unsurprisingly enjoyed, but they can always be disenjoyed, as the example of the monk shows. Any plausible version of hedonism about happiness is clearly going to focus on attitudinal, not sensory pleasure, since happiness rests on many things besides physical sensations and it is unclear how a sensation of pleasure that is not enjoyed could contribute to happiness. Feldman himself [2010: 109-10] , while admitting the existence of purely sensory pleasures, couches his definition of happiness in terms of attitudinal pleasure alone. It is accordingly on attitudinal pleasure that I shall focus.
Happiness too is primarily attitudinal. Generally speaking, people are not just happy; they are happy about … or happy that .... This is not to say that happiness is a purely intellectual state, without accompanying bodily feelings. Like any emotion, happiness is both attitudinal and felt in the body. Understanding how it can be both these things at once is a vexed problem in philosophical psychology, but not one that need concern us here. 3 For a subtle attempt to do justice both the intentionality and the felt quality of emotions, see Goldie [2000] .
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This attitudinal understanding of happiness confronts three apparent counter-examples. Jane might be happy without being happy about anything because she is a) in a happy mood, b) a happy person, or c) a baby or an animal. Let me deal with these in turn.
Happiness as mood. Moods, in contradistinction to emotions, are sometimes said to lack objects. This would spell trouble for an attitudinal analysis of happiness, since there are clearly such things as happy moods. But is it true?
Peter Goldie [2000] has convincingly argued that moods are distinguished from emotions not by lack of object-directedness but by lack of specificity. As he puts it, 'a mood involves feeling towards an object just as much as does an emotion, although ... what the feeling is directed towards will be less specific in the case of a mood [ibid.: 143] .' This must be right.
When I'm in a happy mood I'm not happy about anything in particular but disposed to be happy about many things or about things in general. 4 I warm to the dull old gentleman on the bus; I forgive the insult I received this morning; I may even, if I'm metaphysically inclined, start looking on the world as intrinsically just and beautiful. 'The world of the happy is quite another than that of the unhappy' wrote Wittgenstein in the Tractatus [1922: 88] .
The existence of happy moods poses no threat, then, to the claim that happiness is attitudinal.
We can simply treat happy moods as modifications, of varying degrees of generality, of 6 happiness about particular objects. This is (roughly) how Feldman himself [2010: 137-43] deals with the phenomenon of happy and unhappy moods.
All-in-all happiness. People are often said to be simply happy, without further qualification.
'How's Jane these days?' 'She's very happy.' Such 'all-in-all' happiness looks, on the face of it, non-attitudinal. But it is not really. If Jane is not happy about anything and has no tendency to be in a happy mood, it makes no sense to call her happy. All-in-all happiness is logically tied to happiness about specific things or things in general, which is not necessarily to say that it can be derived from this latter by means of some algorithm.
Of all the things a person can be happy about, those relating to his own life and circumstances seem to be especially relevant to the question of whether he is all-in-all happy. If Jane is happy about her family, job, neighbourhood and so forth, she is happy. If she is unhappy in these respects, joy over recent political developments in Burma will not make up the difference. Happiness is closely related, if not identical, to 'satisfaction with one's life as a whole'. 5 Of course, there are people so absorbed in impersonal projects that they never reflect on their lives as a whole, and so cannot be said to be either satisfied or unsatisfied with them.
Lenin was arguably such a person. Paul Erdős, the famously absent-minded Hungarian In conclusion, it is plausible that happiness is essentially attitudinal, even if the word itself does not always take an object. In what follows, I shall limit myself to overtly attitudinal happiness, assuming that other forms can be treated as modifications or derivations of this.
Happiness and Pleasure Contrasted 8
My next task is to show that happiness and pleasure are distinct concepts. To do this, I shall compare a number of paired sentences referring to the same event, one treating it as an object of happiness, the other as an object of pleasure. As will become clear, the paired sentences are systematically and interestingly distinct in meaning. I do not claim that all such sentences are distinct in this way. Happiness and pleasure are everyday, not technical concepts, so some vagueness and overlap is only to be expected. Nonetheless, I believe that the distinction I am drawing is real and central. I make no apologies, by the way, for this appeal to 'ordinary language'. 'Happiness' and 'pleasure' are both terms of ordinary language, so any philosophical theory of happiness and pleasure needs to be faithful to the way in which these terms are typically used.
What English phrase best expresses attitudinal happiness? 'Happy that …' is misleading here, for it is often just an expression of satisfied preference, equivalent to 'glad that …'. No happiness need be conveyed by 'I'm happy that you had a good harvest in Ethiopia last year'. 6 'Happy about S' is better; it expresses, as I understand it, some feeling of happiness, however mild or insincere. 'S makes me happy' would also do, only it carries the distracting suggestion that S is the cause, not the object of my happiness. On balance, I have decided to go with 'happy about S' as the best expression of attitudinal happiness available in English.
What about attitudinal pleasure? 'Pleased that …' is wrong for the same reason as 'happy that …'. 'I'm pleased that p' need not express any pleasure at all, only a preference for p over notp together with a belief that p. ('I'm pleased that we're going out to dinner. It'll be boring but we owe it to your parents.' 'I'm pleased that I received only three strokes of the cane.') The same holds true of 'pleased by…', 'pleased about…' and 'pleased to…'. 'Take pleasure in 9 …' and 'enjoy…' (phrases I take to be synonymous) are nearer the mark. 7 Feldman himself in certain places treats 'take pleasure in…' as expressive of attitudinal pleasure. In others, his focus is on the phrases 'pleased that…' and 'pleased about …'. 8 (This focus has fatal consequences for his theory, to be discussed later.) In what follows, I use the phrase 'take pleasure in…' to express attitudinal pleasure, occasionally replacing it, for stylistic convenience, with 'enjoy …'.
Here, then, are the sentences. pleasure in Federer's performance without caring or even knowing that it is Federer playing;
his interest in tennis might be a purely aesthetic one. By contrast, if he is happy about Federer's superb performance he is presumably happy that it is Federer who is performing superbly. The two sentences have different truth-conditions. John might be happy about
Federer's superb performance though he didn't take pleasure in it: he wasn't watching. Or he might have taken pleasure in it though he isn't happy about it: he's a Murray fan.
B) Mary was happy about the execution of Dick Turpin Mary took pleasure in the execution of Dick Turpin
Mary cannot take pleasure in the execution of Dick Turpin unless she sees or otherwise experiences it, whereas she might be happy about it after reading a report or hearing a rumour. 'Mary is happy about the execution of Dick Turpin' implies that she thinks it in some way a good thing. If asked why she is happy about it she might reply 'it is what he deserves' or 'it will make the roads safe again'. 'Mary took pleasure in the execution of Dick
Turpin' implies none of this. Mary might simply have relished the spectacle of a good hanging.
C) Susan is happy about drinking the Château Lafite Susan takes pleasure in drinking the Château Lafite
Susan can only take pleasure in drinking the Château Lafite if she tastes it, whereas she can be happy about drinking it even if she doesn't taste it (she might be a wine snob with a heavy cold). 'Susan is happy about drinking the Château Lafite' implies that she thinks drinking the Château Lafite is a good thing to do, all things considered. 'Susan takes pleasure in drinking the Château Lafite' has no such implication; she might think it a terrible waste of money, yet 11 still take pleasure in it. Susan might even be said to take pleasure in drinking the Château
Lafite not knowing that it is Château Lafite.
These examples suggest two rough, preliminary thoughts. First, pleasure, but not happiness, is essentially a way of experiencing an object. (Happiness is an experience, of course, but not a way of experiencing an object.) I cannot (logically) take pleasure in Federer's performance unless I witness it, but I can be happy about Federer's performance without witnessing it.
Second, happiness, but not pleasure, is essentially bound up with beliefs about its object, in particular the belief that it is in some way good. Pleasure, in short, is an essentially experiential state. Happiness is an essentially doxastic state.
These are rough thoughts. Let me unpack them in more detail. I wish to defend the following six theses:
i. If one takes pleasure in s, one experiences s.
To take pleasure in a state of affairs s is to experience it in a certain way. This experience need not be direct. One can take pleasure in s by watching it on TV or even reading about it in the paper ('I've been enjoying the latest parliamentary drama in the pages of the Times').
Nor need it be tied to a particular sense modality. One can enjoy a cricket match, after a fashion, by listening to a radio commentary or by following a scoreboard outside the ground, as used to be common. 
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enjoy the fact that p is, in short, to enjoy thinking that p, and this kind of enjoyment is as much an experience as any other.
As confirmation of this, consider the difference between the following two sentences:
D) I take pleasure in the fact that David Cameron was humiliated I am happy about the fact that David Cameron was humiliated
It is easy to imagine situations in which only one of these two sentences is true. A person might relish the thought of David Cameron's being humiliated while dreading its political consequences, or he might welcome its political consequences while feeling bad for the man himself. The general point is that happiness about p (or the fact that p) does not imply any pleasure in the thought of p, and vice versa, though of course the two things normally come together.
ii. It need not be the case that, if one is happy about s, one experiences s.
This is clear enough from the above examples. Being happy about a state of affairs s implies that one holds certain beliefs about the nature of s, but these beliefs need not be based on any experience of s, direct or indirect. They can be based purely on reports.
iii. If one is happy about s, one believes that s satisfies the description 's'.
Suppose that Mary is happy about Dick Turpin's execution. Then someone informs her that there has been a muddle-up at the gallows; Dick Turpin has escaped and another poor wretch hung in his place. Mary's happiness evaporates. The event she thought of as the execution of Dick Turpin was not, in fact, the execution of Dick Turpin. 'I was happy about the execution of Dick Turpin', she might say, 'but now I realise that I had nothing to be happy about.'
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In short, when we say that Mary is happy about the execution of Dick Turpin, we are using the phrase 'the execution of Dick Turpin' in an intensional sense. We need not be able to replace it with an extensionally equivalent phrase -'the execution of Mary's brother', say Mary is at Tyburn enjoying the execution, as she thinks, of Dick Turpin. Someone tells her that there's been a muddle-up in prison; Dick Turpin has escaped and someone else brought for execution in his place. Mary's enjoyment of the event is unaffected. She has nothing against Dick Turpin. In fact, she knows nothing about him apart from his name. She just likes the spectacle of a good hanging. Indeed (to put the point the other way round) we can legitimately say that Mary is enjoying the execution of Dick Turpin even if Mary herself has no idea that the man whose execution she is enjoying is in fact Dick Turpin.
11 The fact that 'the execution of Dick Turpin' in the sentence 'Mary is happy about the execution of Dick
Turpin' is not a proposition needn't trouble us, for it can easily be converted into one without change of meaning: 'Mary is happy about the fact that Dick Turpin has been executed'. The same is true for all the other examples above.
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In short, when we say that so-and-so takes pleasure in or enjoys s, the phrase s is often being used in a purely extensional sense. We can replace it with any referentially equivalent phrase is enjoying, we might say, the execution of her brother's murderer. Should she discover that the man on the gallows is not her brother's murderer, her enjoyment must cease. Another example from Anscombe is 'Jane is enjoying talking to the most handsome man present'. On a natural interpretation of this phrase, Jane's enjoyment of the man's company must wither the moment her eyes alight on a more handsome man. Both these sentences pick out the object of enjoyment intensionally, not extensionally; they do not imply that Chloe is enjoying the execution of Mary's long-lost brother, or that Jane is enjoying talking to the biggest crook in the room. However, the feeling they describe is still one of pleasure, not happiness, since its object is essentially experiential. Chloe can only take pleasure in the execution of her brother's murderer if she experiences it, whereas she can be happy about it without experiencing it.
v. If one is happy about s, one believes (on pain of irrationality) that s is in some way good.
Thesis 5 is based on the thought that the object of happiness is always some perceived good, personal or general. In scholastic terms, goodness is the 'formal object' of happiness, just as danger is of fear, a gift of gratitude, and so forth. 13 Such formal objects stand in a relationship of justification to their corresponding emotions. To realise that the object of one's happiness is not in fact good is to see that it gives one no reason to be happy. For instance, if Mary finds out that Dick Turpin was not a brutal murderer but a gallant Robin Hood type figure, her happiness over his execution should melt away. His execution is no cause for happiness.
13 This thesis must be distinguished from the 'guise of the good' hypothesis, according to which the rational agent always pursues ends he regards as good. It might seem vulnerable to a parallel counter-proposal, though, which is that happiness about a state of affairs s implies only a desire for s and a belief that s obtains; it does not commit one to a further belief that s is good. I'm not sure that this counter-proposal succeeds, but in any case it does not undermine the contrast I am drawing between happiness and pleasure. For even if we want to rephrase Thesis 5 as 'if one is happy about s, one desires s and believes that s obtains', it is clear that enjoying s implies no such desire. Mary, in the example below, does not desire the execution of Dick Turpin, but she is not behaving irrationally in nonetheless taking pleasure in it. For further discussion, see Velleman [1992] .
I add the proviso 'on pain of irrationality' in acknowledgement of the fact that it is possible to be happy about a state of affairs one does not think good. Consider a woman who embarks on an affair knowing that it will probably end in misery and destroy her marriage into the bargain. She has no good reason to be happy about the affair, yet she is happy about it -'absurdly happy', as we might say. Emotions can be what Goldie [2000: 78] calls 'cognitively impenetrable': one can feel towards things as being a particular way 'whilst at the same time believing them not to be so'. Emotions and beliefs can come apart, even if they ought in all consistency to move together.
The phenomenon of happy moods suggests a qualification of this connection, for the thoughts associated with such moods are typically 'entertained' rather than strictly believed. Take this description of a happy mood, from Virginia Woolf's Room of One's Own:
And thus by degrees was lit, half-way down the spine, which is the seat of the soul, not that hard little electric light which we call brilliance, as it pops in and out upon our lips, but the more profound, subtle and subterranean glow which is the rich yellow flame of rational intercourse. No need to hurry. No need to sparkle.
No need to be anyone but oneself. We are all going to heaven and Vandyke is of the company -in other words, how good life seemed, how sweet its rewards, how trivial this grudge or that grievance, how admirable friendship and the society of one's kind, as, lighting a good cigarette, one sunk among the cushions in the window-seat [1977: 12] .
Clearly, Virginia Woolf does not believe that life is good and so forth, nor is she rationally committed to any such belief; rather, she entertains these thoughts because she is in a happy mood. irrational. I shall not try to assess this set of ideas here. I shall only say that if there is any irrationality involved in taking pleasure in things one believes to be bad, it is distinct from the stronger kind of irrationality involved in being happy about things one believes to be bad.
The happy adulterer described earlier was a divided soul, rather as someone frightened of mice or heights is a divided soul. In Goldie's [2000: 78] words, she was 'feeling towards things as being a particular way, whilst at the same time believing them not to be so'.
Nothing like this is involved in the case of Mary. A pleasure-seeker may be cynical and frivolous yet utterly self-possessed.
Let me summarise. Happiness and attitudinal pleasure are distinct states of mind. To take pleasure in s is necessarily to experience s; to be happy about s is not necessarily to experience s. To be happy about s is necessarily to believe that s satisfies the description 's'.
To take pleasure in s is not necessarily to have such a belief. To be happy about s is to be rationally committed to a belief that s is in some way good. To take pleasure in s is not to be committed to any such belief.
Hedonism about happiness
Let me return to the question with which I opened this essay: the question of hedonism about happiness. Fred Feldman [2010: 137] has argued that 'to be happy at a moment is to be taking more pleasure than displeasure in things at that moment. Happiness in an interval is the integral of happiness at moments within the interval. … Happiness in life as a whole is happiness in the interval that is your whole life.' I needn't dwell here on the details of this However, Feldman is not entirely consistent in his rejection of the experiential character of pleasure. In certain places, he suggests that attitudinal pleasure is expressed not only by 'pleased that …' and 'pleased to …' but also 'takes pleasure in …' and even 'enjoys …'. For instance, Feldman tries to persuade us that 'Otto', the 'rigid Kantian moralist' who dutifully visits his sick neighbour in hospital, is not feeling attitudinal pleasure since he does not 'enjoy' or 'take pleasure in' the visit. 16 He neglects to mention that Otto might well be pleased that he is visiting his sick neighbour, meaning simply that he is glad to be fulfilling his duty.
15 See Mason [2007] and Zimmerman [2007] .
16 Feldman [2010: 117] . Feldman's use of the verb 'enjoy' in this context is puzzling, since he claims elsewhere that enjoyment is not the same as attitudinal pleasure. See footnote 7.
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Overlooked in this discussion is the fact that 'pleased that …' and 'takes pleasure in …' mean quite different things. 'Pleased that …' implies belief but not necessarily experience; 'takes pleasure in …' implies experience but not necessarily belief. Feldman needs both phrases. He needs the first to show that attitudinal pleasure is unlimited in its objects, else it would not be a plausible constituent of happiness; and he needs the second to show that it is essentially experiential, else it would not be recognisable as pleasure. But of course, no one mental state can be both unlimited in its objects and limited to objects of experience. Feldman's 'attitudinal pleasure' is a mishmash. Real attitudinal pleasure is always pleasure in some object of experience, and as such is categorially distinct from happiness.
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